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BEYOND BAKKE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
REDRESSING THE SOCIAL HISTORY
OF RACISM
Robert Allen Sedler*
The crucial constitutional issue today in the area of racial equality
is the extent to which governmental entities1 are required or permitted
to take action to redress the present consequences of the social history
of racism in this nation. 2 Full redress for this history of racism would
require equalization of the societal position of blacks as a group 3 with
that of whites as a group. It would mean ending white supremacy in all
of its manifestations and, in the words of Justice Marshall, achieving
"genuine equality" 4 between blacks and whites in American society.
The effort to achieve genuine racial equality must reconcile
blacks' and whites' conflicting perceptions of the relationship between
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. B.A. 1956, J.D. 1959, University
of Pittsburgh. The author would like to thank Bruce Baltar for his work gathering the
statistical data for the first section of this Article.
"Governmental entities" refers to agencies of federal, state, and local govern-
ments and to the courts.
2 See pp. 136-39 infra.
3 Although this Article focuses on blacks, the social history of racism has also
had an adverse impact on other racial-ethnic groups, such as Hispanics and Native
Americans, who, like blacks, have been subject to discrimination and victimization
because the dominant majority has perceived them as "nonwhite." See, e.g., Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1973) (educational opportunities of
Hispanics). For constitutional purposes, the legislature should be able to conclude that
the needs and values of governmental actions designed to provide equality for blacks
are applicable to these groups as well. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98
S. Ct. 2733, 2784 n.35 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). It should
be noted that Justice Powell's discussion in Bakke of the difficulty in determining
which groups should receive "preference," id. at 2751-53 (Powell, J.), was in the
context of holding that the use of race-conscious criteria favoring minorities was
subject to "strict scrutiny"; Justice Powell did not indicate that the legislature was
precluded from assimilating other "nonwhite" groups to blacks for purposes involving
the use of race-conscious criteria. More detailed discussion of the use of racial criteria
to favor other racial-ethnic groups, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
4 98 S. Ct. at 2804 (Marshall, J.).
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past discrimination and its present effects. If the public opinion polls
are to be believed, a majority of white Americans oppose discrimina-
tion against black Americans and in this sense favor "racial equality."
But white Americans also insist that they are not responsible for what
happened in the past and that they should not be expected to make
sacrifices in order to "compensate" blacks for past societal discrimi-
nation.5 Herein, of course, lies the dilemma. If action is to be taken to
overcome the present consequences of this nation's history of racism,
such action will benefit blacks as a group at the expense of individual
whites who will suffer the direct impact of such action. 6
This Article will not address the moral aspects of the dilemma,
although a persuasive argument may be made that the moral equities
weigh in favor of an effort to eliminate the consequences of racism. 7
Rather, this Article will approach the question from a constitutional
perspective,8 and will maintain that the Constitution permits, and in
some circumstances requires, governmental entities to take action to
5 See Release, American Institute of Public Opinion, June 1, 1977 (Gallup Poll).
6 It will not "illegitimately" benefit blacks as a group at the expense of whites as
a group, since whites as a group can have no legitimate interest in maintaining their
present position of societal dominance. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
7 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2802-03 (1978)
(Marshall, J.).
8 I do not purport to be taking an "objective" view of the question. I have been
much too involved, both as an academic commentator, see, e.g., Sedler, Racial
Preference, Reality and the Constitution: Bakke v. Board of Regents of the University
of California, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sedler,
Racial Preference], and as a lawyer to do so. In the latter capacity I was the principal
author of the amicus curiae brief of the Society of American Law Teachers in Bakke,
urging reversal of the judgment of the California Supreme Court. I have also filed an
amicus curiae brief on behalf of New Detroit, Inc., an urban coalition in the Detroit
metropolitan area, in the appeal of Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F.
Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1163 (6th Cir. Apr. 25,
1978), a case involving a challenge to the City of Detroit's affirmative action program
with respect to police promotions. In addition, I have been an attorney for the plaintiffs
in school desegregation cases, see Sedler, Book Review, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 645,
645 n. I (1977), and am currently acting as counsel in school desegregation cases in
Atlanta, Georgia, and Akron, Ohio. As to the effect of "adversary involvement" on
.academic perspective," see Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of
Milliken - On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely from
Within, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 535, 537 n.9 [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Metropolitan
Desegregation ].
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overcome the present consequences of past discrimination. The em-
phasis will be on the link between the past history of racism and its
present effects, and on the constitutional significance of that link.
The first section of the Article will discuss the causal relationship
between the social history of racism and the denial of equal participa-
tion for blacks in American society today. The second section will
discuss the Bakke9 decision and its implications for the constitutional-
ity of using race-conscious criteria to provide equal participation for
blacks. The third section will show that the government may be
affirmatively required to take action to overcome the present conse-
quences of past discrimination when the government itself has been
implicated in identified prior discrimination. The final section will set
forth the Article's central thesis: that the government is constitution-
ally permitted to use race-conscious criteria in an appropriate manner
in order to overcome the present consequences of the social history of
racism and provide equal participation for blacks in all aspects of
American life.
I. OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOCIAL
HISTORY OF RACISM: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The history of racism in America need not be set out at length. It
has become saddeningly familiar and was traced fully by Justice
Marshall in Bakke. 10 It had its genesis in the institution of chattel
slavery, and it is a history of inferiority established by law; of rampant
discrimination in employment; of ghettoization; of segregated and tan-
gibly inadequate schooling; and of the denial of access to societal
power. Racial discrimination was often commanded by government at
all levels, and when it was not commanded, it was tolerated and
encouraged. Private entities and individuals added their significant
contribution to the social pattern of racism. Indeed, only in the last two
decades has any real progress been made in halting much of the overt
discrimination practiced against blacks in America.
An extended analysis of the causal relationship between this his-
tory of overt societal racism and blacks' current inequality is beyond
the scope of this Article. It is apparent, however, that the nation's
9 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
10 Id. at 2798-2803 (Marshall, J.).
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purposeful and systematic relegation of the entire black race to an
inferior status in American society had many characteristics which
have perpetuated racial inequality to the present day, when overt dis-
crimination itself is much reduced. For example, their family's relega-
tion to a low economic status has a severe detrimental impact on the
educational attainments of children."I Low educational attainment in
turn has a severe detrimental impact, when the children become adults,
on their economic status, social mobility, political involvement, and
other indicia of social wellbeing. ' 2 Indeed, even if this negative cycle
could be eliminated, and all overt discrimination eliminated as well,
the unequal status of blacks in American society would nonetheless
continue for many years. An examination of "elite" professions such
as law and medicine, where blacks are still grossly underrepre-
sented, 13 illustrates the point. If law and medical schools were to begin
admitting black applicants in direct proportion to their numbers in the
general population, there would be only a slight yearly increase in the
overall percentage of blacks within the professions as the racially
representative classes began to graduate. Complete equality would not
be attained until virtually all of the current members of the profession,
disproportionate numbers of whom are white, had retired. It is estima-
ted that it would take at least seven generations to achieve complete\ equality in the occupational distribution of blacks and whites, even if
all overt discrimination in the job market were eliminated. 14 To the
extent that discrimination continues, and is not redressed, true equality
can never be achieved.
Given the self-perpetuating nature of societal inferiority, it is not
surprising that fundamental inequalities between blacks and whites still
permeate virtually every aspect of our society. Blacks continue to lag
significantly behind whites in the level of education attained. 15 When
I See, e.g., C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY 138-41 (1972).
12 See, e.g., J. GUTHRIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H. LEVIN, & R. STOUT, SCHOOLS
AND INEQUALITY 91-108 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SCHOOLS AND INEQUAL-
ITY].
13 Seep. 138 infra.
14 Lieberson & Fuguitt, Negro- White Occupational Differences in the Absence
of Discrimination, 73 AM. J. Soc. 188, 193 (1967).
,1 In 1976, the median number of school years completed by black males was
10.8, compared to 12.5 for white males. The median for black women over age 25 was
11.4 years, compared to 12.4 for white women. (All figures are for people over age
[Vol. 14
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the quality of education received by blacks is considered, the gap
grows even wider. One indication that blacks in this country receive an
education substantially inferior to that of whites is found in recent
studies which show that in urban areas, where the great majority of
American blacks now live, 16 there is marked discrimination in educa-
tional expenditures between low-income, predominantly nonwhite
neighborhoods and wealthier, predominantly white areas, even within
the same school districts. 17 Similarly, the average levels of teachers'
experience, salary, and verbal skills in urban schools decrease as
neighborhood income levels and the percentage of white students de-
crease. 18 While the relative importance of educational expenditures
and even of teacher experience has been disputed,1 9 it is nonetheless
clear .that the level of knowledge actually imparted to black school
children by our educational system is far below that which white
children attain. 20
25.) U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 136 (1977) (table 217) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT]. A black American in 1976 was only 32% as likely to graduate from college
and only 85% as likely to graduate from high school as his or her white counterpart.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES
AND WOMEN 12-14 (1978) (tables 2.3 and 2.4) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL INDI-
CATORS].
16 In 1970, 74.3% of blacks lived in standard metropolitan statistical areas, as
defined by the Bureau of the Census. And 58.2% lived in the central cities. STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT, supra note 15, at 16 (table 15).
17 SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY, supra note 12, at 34--36; J. OWEN, SCHOOL
INEQUALITY AND THE WELFARE STATE 18-21 (1974). The latter study found that in a
typical city, the educational expenditure per child increased by $18 for every $1000
increase in average per family neighborhood income. Id.
'8 J. OWEN, supra note 17, at 20-22.
19 Compare J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 290-330
(1966) and C. JENCKS, supra note 11, at 146-53 with SCHOOLS AND INEQUAL-
ITY, supra note 12, at 57-90.
20 A recent assessment under the United States Office of Education's Right to
Read program found that only 58% of black seventeen-year-olds were functionally
literate, compared to 87% of white seventeen-year-olds. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUD-
GET OFFICE, INEQUALITIES IN THE EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF BLACK AND
WHITE AMERICANS 8-9 (1977). By the time black males reach high school, they are
more than twice as likely to be two or more grades behind in school than are their
majority peers. SOCIAL *INDICATORS, supra note 15, at 6 (table 2.1). The disparity in
educational quality carries over into higher education, where blacks are more likely
138 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 14
The unequal position of blacks in American society is reflected in
the area of employment as well. To begin with, blacks suffer substan-
tially higher-than-average unemployment rates.21 In addition, a dis-
proportionate number of blacks who are employed are found in low-
paying, low-prestige 22 occupational categories; working blacks are
underrepresented in the more "elite" jobs. 23 Even within the "blue
than whites to attend poorly rated colleges, according to freshman aptitude scores.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUALITY OF
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 79 (1975) (second of a four-part series). Blacks are more
likely to enroll in public and junior colleges than are whites, and two out of five black
college students attend all-black institutions. Id.
21 In 1976 the unemployment rate for black males stood at 15.9%, compared to
5.9% for whites. The rates for women were 18.9% and 8.7% respectively. SOCIAL
INDICATORS, supra note 15, at 30 (table 3.1). The inequality was even greater for black
teenagers, with 47.8% of black males and 51.3% of black females in the sixteen-to-
nineteen-year-old range unemployed, compared to 5.9% and 19.2% for whites. Id. at
32 (table 3.2).
The figures are based on Bureau of the Census data, and indicate the percentage
of the population who are fifteen years of age or older, out of work, and actively
seeking work. They exclude "discouraged workers," those individuals who have
worked in the past but who, due to a perceived lack of employment opportunity, were
not actively seeking employment when the data were collected. A disproportionate
number of such individuals are members of minority groups, and hence the actual gap
in employment between blacks and whites is larger than the statistics indicate. Id. at
28-29. See also, Flaim, Discouraged Workers and Changes in Unemployment,
MONTHLY LABOR REvIEw, Mar. 1973, at 12.
22 The United States Commission on Civil Rights recently surveyed the relative
"prestige values" of the occupations of white and nonwhite workers, employing a
study that devised "prestige scores" for each occupational category used by the
Bureau of the Census. SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 15, at 34. It found that the
prestige value of the average black male worker was only 77% of that of his white
counterpart. Id. at 36 (table 3.4).
23 As of 1970, black men constituted only 1.2% of our nation's male lawyers and
judges, 2.0% of its male physicians and dentists, 2.8% of its male scientists, and 1.7%
of its accountants. Black women constituted only 7.4% of our nation's female scien-
tists and only 4.3% of its female accountants. The Bureau of the Census did not
compile figures for female lawyers, judges, physicians, or dentists. In 1970, blacks
made up over 11% of the national population. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 15,
at 407-08 (table 662), 31 (table 35).
In 1976, 34.7% of the nonwhite work force was employed in all "white collar"
occupations, compared to 51.8% of white workers. Conversely, 25.4% of nonwhite
workers were employed in "service" occupations, including household help, while
only 12.3% of white workers were so employed. Id. at 407 (table 661).
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collar" category, where the distribution of blacks and whites is more
equal,24 blacks are disproportionately concentrated in the least desir-
able occupations. 25
High unemployment rates and concentration in low-income, low-
prestige occupations have had their predictable impact on overall black
income levels. A much greater percentage of black families live below
the federally defined poverty level, and a black family's median in-
come is barely more than half that of a white family. 26 Furthermore,
blacks enjoy significantly less upward mobility in income than do
whites .27
It is painfully obvious that a quarter of a century after Brown,28
the consequences of our history of racism are still With us, as measured
by the fundamental criteria of education, employment, and income. It
remains to be considered how, consistent with the Constitution, this
persistent inequality may best be overcome.
Until very recently, the struggle for racial equality concentrated
almost entirely on attacking the existing structure of societal racism, in
order to remove the structural impediments that denied equality to
racial minorities. 29 From a legal standpoint, this struggle has been
24 "Blue collar" categories employed 37.6% of black workers and 32.6% of
white workers in 1976. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 15, at 407 (table 661).
2- For instance, 8.3% of all nonwhite workers were employed as nonfarm la-
borers, compared to 4.5% of all white workers. The crafts employed 8.7% of all
nonwhite workers but 13.4% of all white workers. Id.
26 In 1976, 28.2% of all blacks lived in families whose income was below the
poverty level, compared to 7.5% of whites. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 15, at
454 (table 735). The median income for black families was only 59% that of white
families, id. at 445 (table 717), and the disparity in median household per capita
income was even greater (as of 1975), with blacks earning only 52% as much as
whites. SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 15, at 50 (table 4.2). ("Household per capita
income" is an individual household's income divided by the number of household
members. Id. at 52.)
27 The average earnings increment by age for black males is only 49% of that for
white males. Id. at 58 (table 4.4).
28 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29 As Justice Powell noted in Bakke, at the time of the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, what has now come to be called "affirmative action" was
unknown: "There simply was no reason for Congress to consider the validity of
hypothetical preferences that might be accorded minority citizens; the legislators were
dealing with the real and pressing problem of how to guarantee those citizens equal
treatment." 98 S. Ct. at 2746 (Powell, J.).
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largely successful. 30 The Constitution has now been interpreted to
prohibit state-imposed segregation and other traditional forms of dis-
crimination against racial minorities. 31 Federal laws prohibit racial
discrimination in voting, employment, public accommodations and
housing, and similar protection is afforded by the laws of many states.
This means that there is now a system of prevention: the law prohibits
present discrimination against racial minorities and provides remedies
for such discrimination. 32 But this system of prevention does not pur-
port to deal directly with the present effects of past discrimination. 33
Moreover, because the effects of past discrimination are so pervasive,
the system of prevention will do relatively little to alter blacks' so-
cietally disadvantaged position.
If the removal of structural barriers to equality alone could bring
about equal participation in the benefits of American society, the soci-
etal position of blacks should have improved significantly during the
last decade. But such has not been the case; they remain in a disadvan-
taged position. 34 Just as a physician must not only arrest a disease and
30 This does not mean that overt discrimination against blacks does not persist.
One measure of blacks' continuing economic disadvantage attributable solely to race
appears in the result of a recent comparison of earnings of minority and white workers,
conducted by the United States Commission on Civil Rights. The Commission isola-
ted race as the determinative factor by adjusting the average earnings levels by group
in order to compensate for group differences in education, age, occupational prestige,
hours worked, and income of state of residence. SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 15, at
53-56. The Commission found that an average black male worker earns only 85% as
much as a white worker who is identical in every respect except race. Id. at 54 (table
4.3).
11 For a discussion and review of cases, see Sedler, Racial Preference, supra
note 8, at 370-72.
32 The same protection against racial discrimination is afforded to whites as well.
See the discussion in Bakke, 98 S. Ct. at 2749-53 (Powell, J.). However, because the
social history of racism has been one of discrimination against blacks, remedying the
consequences of that social history may have an adverse impact upon the interests of
individual whites. As the subsequent analysis will demonstrate, it does not for that
reason constitute invidious racial discrimination. See pp. 164-66 infra.
33 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
34 The Civil Rights Commission found that from 1960 to 1976, blacks as a group
had made some gains in absolute terms according to a number of indicators of social
wellbeing. Nonetheless, there was little improvement in blacks' societal position
vis-i-vis whites. SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 15, at 89-91. As the Commission
stated, "majority males have continued to enjoy broader opportunities and to reap
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prevent its recurrence but must also prescribe treatment for its
lingering effects, our society must now deal with the lingering effects
of its legacy of racism. If the Constitution and laws of this nation do no
more than embody a system of prevention, we will not see an end in
the foreseeable future to what one study has called "two societies,
black and white, separate and unequal. ' ' 35 For this reason the crucial
constitutional issue of racial equality today revolves around govern-
mental action to overcome the lasting effects of racism in the United
States.
II. THE BAKKE DECISION
In Bakke only five members of the Court reached the issue of the
constitutionality of remedying the effects of this country's history of
racism. The University's efforts to deal with one of these effects - the
serious shortage of minority physicians, and the absence of minority
students in the University's medical school - involved the use of
race-conscious criteria in medical school admissions. As a general
proposition, the permissibility of the government's use of race-
conscious criteria depends on whether, in the circumstances presented,
it amounts to invidious racial discrimination; for it is invidious racial
discrimination that is proscribed by the Constitution. 36 To determine
whether the use of race-conscious criteria in the University's admis-
sions process amounted to invidious racial discrimination, Justice
Powell subjected the Davis program to review under a standard pur-
portedly different from that applied by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun (the Brennan group). 37 Both the Powell and
Brennan group opinions rejected the University's argument that so-
called "benign discrimination, 38 need pass muster only under the
disproportionate benefits while women and minority males have in many instances
-fallen even further behind." Id. at 91.
35 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
36 See Sedler, Racial Preference, supra note 8, at 368-72.
37 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun are joint authors of the
opinion. 98 S. Ct. at 2766 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
38 Benign discrimination, from the University's perspective, was any action dis-
criminating in favor of those who, unlike white males, require "extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritarian political process." Id. at 2748 (Powell, J.). See also Sedler,
Racial Preference, supra note 8, at 362-63 (discrimination by white majority against
itself is constitutionally irrelevant).
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purportedly less restrictive "rational relationship" test. The Brennan
group instead asserted that "benign" racial classifications should be
tested against the intermediate yet still "searching" standard that the
Court has applied in cases of discrimination on the basis of gender. By
that standard, the classification must serve an "important and articula-
ted" purpose, and must be "substantially related" to achieving that
purpose. 39
Justice Powell, on the other hand, argued that any classification
based on race was inherently suspect and was therefore subject to "the
most exacting judicial examination.' '40 He accordingly applied his
formulation of the "strict scrutiny" standard to the University's
claims: a state "must show that its purpose or interest is both constitu-
tionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the [race-
conscious] classification is 'necessary . . .to the accomplishment' of
its purpose or the safe-guarding of its interest. " 41
The Justices' seeming disagreement over the appropriate standard
of review reflects a more significant disagreement over which govern-
mental interests are of sufficient importance to justify the use of race-
conscious criteria. In any event, we will use Justice Powell's test for
permissible government action, on the assumption that any use of
race-conscious criteria that Justice Powell would sustain, the Brennan
group would sustain as well.
Under Justice Powell's formulation, invidious (and therefore un-
constitutional) racial discrimination is any use of race-conscious crite-
ria that is not necessary to the accomplishment of a valid and substan-
tial governmental interest. 42 This principle is illustrated by the cases in
which the Court has invalidated the use of race-conscious criteria
directed against racial minorities .43 The use of race-conscious criteria
directed against whites is equally unconstitutional where it is not cru-
39 98 S. Ct. at 2784-85 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
40 Id, at 2749 (Powell, J.).
41 id, at 2756-57 (citations omitted).
42 As the Supreme Court has stated, in order for the use of "racial classifica-
tions" to be sustained, it "must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of
some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was
the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 11 (1967).
43 For a discussion and review of cases, see Sedler, Racial Preference, supra
note 8, at 370-72.
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cial to the advancement of the requisite governmental interest. The
state, for example, could no more systematically exclude whites from
serving on juries 44 or bar them from using public facilities than it could
exclude or bar blacks. 45 This being so, it is submitted that the concept
of "reverse" or "benign" discrimination, in the sense that such con-
cepts distinguish between the use of race-conscious criteria directed
against racial minorities and the use of similar criteria directed against
whites, is analytically unsound. All use of race-conscious criteria must
be subjected to "strict scrutiny," 46 and all racial discrimination found
to be invidious is unconstitutional whenever practiced by the state,
whether at the instance of whites or at the instance of blacks47 and
whether the victims of such discrimination are blacks or whites or
both.48
The question then is whether the use of race-conscious criteria in
any given set of circumstances advances a valid and substantial gov-
ernmental interest by what the Court finds to be appropriate means.49
It is this question that divided Justice Powell and the Brennan group in
44 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
4- Cf. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th
Cir.), affd per curiam, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (city may not deny blacks equal access to
city park facilities solely on grounds of race).
46 This is true for both the Powell and the Brennan group formulations of strict
scrutiny.
47 Cf. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (discrimination by Mexican-
Americans in the "governing majority" against Mexican-Americans is tested under
the same standard as discrimination by whites in the "governing majority").
48 See 98 S. Ct. at 2749-53 (Powell, J.) (discussion of the same point in the
context of "strict scrutiny").
49 In Bakke, Justice Powell stated that the use of race-conscious criteria had to be
"necessary" to the accomplishment of a valid and substantial governmental interest.
See, e.g., id. at 2757. At another point he referred to a "burden . . .precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." Id. at 2753. It is clear that
Justice Powell is insisting on very careful scrutiny of the means-ends fit whenever the
use of race-conscious criteria is involved, and he applied such scrutiny in Bakke. Id. at
2759-64. Nonetheless, as indicated by his approval of the "Harvard method," Justice
Powell also made it clear that race-conscious criteria may be used to advance some
racial objectives, such as diversity within a university's student body. More signifi-
cant, perhaps, he indicated approval of quota-type remedies to redress identified
discrimination in the employment area. Id. at 2754-55. As the Fifth Circuit recently
observed in Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1294 (5th Cir. 1978), when it upheld
the imposition of such a remedy: "The Bakke decision should not be viewed as a
1979]
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Bakke, in the context of admission to a publicly supported university.
The University argued that its minority admissions program was de-
signed to overcome a present effect of past racism, the shortage of
minority physicians, and thus that it advanced a valid and substantial
governmental interest. Justice Powell posed the question in terms of
whether the University was justified in using race-conscious criteria
for the purpose of "helping certain groups whom the faculty of the
Davis Medical School perceived as the victims of 'societal discrimina-
tion,' '"s) and concluded that it was not. The Brennan group, on the
other hand, related the shortage of minority physicians to the social
history of racism 5' and concluded that
Davis' articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past
societal discrimination is, under our cases, sufficiently im-
portant to justify the use of race-conscious admissions pro-
grams where there is a sound basis for concluding that
minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and
that the handicap of past discrimination is impeding access
of minorities to the medical school. 52
The four Justices who subscribed to the Stevens opinion and decided
the case on Title VI grounds did not reach this question.
contrary decision of law applicable to the issue of the constitutionality of affirmative
hiring relief, but as a decision reaffirming the equitable power of the federal courts to
remedy the effects of unconstitutional acts through race-conscious means." The avail-
ability of alternative and "less drastic" means to advance the racial objective is, of
course, relevant in determining whether the particular means at issue is "necessary."
Also relevant is the reasonableness of the racial preference and the burdefi that it places
on those who are adversely affected by it. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 E2d
315, 330 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972), one'of the cases cited by
Justice Powell in Bakke. There is no magic, however, in the use of words such as
"necessary," "precisely tailored," "less drastic means," and the like. There will be
careful scrutiny of the means-ends fit, and the court must conclude that the particular
means used are appropriate to achieve the racial objective in the circumstances pre-
sented. The concept of appropriate means therefore seems to be the most helpful in
expressing the standard by which a court evaluates the means-ends fit in the context of
race-conscious criteria.
10 98 S. Ct. at 2759 (Powell, J.).
51 See Sedler, Racial Preference, supra note 8, at 355-6 1.
2 98 S. Ct. at 2785 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
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In light of the division of Justices in Bakke, it cannot be said that
the Court has yet resolved whether remedying the consequences of
societal racism by providing for equal participation by blacks in all
aspects of American life advances a valid and substantial governmen-
tal interest. If the position of the Brennan group had commanded a
majority, Bakke would have been a sweeping decision and would have
gone a long way to support the thesis set forth in this Article. If
governmental action designed to overcome the present consequences
of the social history of racism, as reflected in minority underrepresen-
tation in the medical profession, had been found to advance a valid and
substantial governmental interest, the same finding presumably would
apply to actions taken to increase minority participation in all aspects
of American life in which they have been denied such participation.
As it now stands, Bakke has resolved very little. The point on
which Justice Powell and the Brennan group implicitly agreed, that
maintaining educational diversity in a university student body ad-
vanced a valid and substantial governmental interest,5 3 does not in one
sense go much beyond the Court's earlier holding that public school
systems could use race-conscious criteria in student assignment for the
purposes of integration.5 4 The Court has yet to render a definitive
holding on the question whether the government can employ race-
conscious criteria to advance the equal-participation objective. When
the question arises again, one or more of the Justices who joined the
Stevens opinion may adopt the position of the Brennan group on this
crucial issue of racial equality. 55 It is the unresolved issue of Bakke.
S3 Id. at 2760-61 (Powell, J.), 2767 n.1 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Black-
mun, JJ.). In the view of the Brennan group, however, "the use of race to achieve an
integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination."
Id. at 2767 n. 1. Justice Powell, on the other hand, saw the University's interest as
rooted in the first amendment principle of academic freedom. It is precisely because
Justice Powell saw the University's interest in light of its own particularized function,
rather than in light of broader societal needs, that he found the use of rigid racial quotas
to be impermissible; he considered them to be counterproductive to advancing educa-
tional diversity. As he put it: "Petitioner's special admissions program, focused solely
on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity."
Id. at 2761 (Powell, J.) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). It was in this
context that he held up Harvard's approach as a model. Id. at 2762-63.
S4 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In another
sense, Bakke goes significantly farther. See pp. 158-59 infra.
S It may be significant in this regard that in United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977), both Justice Stevens and Justice Rehnquist were of
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III. REMEDYING THE CONSEQUENCES OF
IDENTIFIED DISCRIMINATION
Incorporating the doctrine of prior cases, Bakke does make it
clear that the use of race-conscious criteria to redress the consequences
of identified past discrimination by the governmental agency undertak-
ing such action advances a valid and substantial governmental interest.
As Justice Powell put it, "The State certainly has a legitimate interest
in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of
identified discrimination." 5 6 Indeed, the governmental agency that
has practiced prior discrimination may be affirmatively required to
undertake action to eliminate the effects of its past discriminatory
conduct.5 7 To the extent that "identified" discrimination is a subset of
this nation's social history of racism, the Constitution requires the
government to act to overcome its present consequences.
Justice Powell illustrates the requirement that government entities
remedy the effects of identified discrimination by citing the school
desegregation cases. In those cases, whether involving school districts
in states where school desegregation was required by state law prior to
Brown 58 or school districts in states where it was not, the courts' focus
is on the relationship between past governmental action and the present
racially segregated character of the school system. If the past govern-
mental actions, whether mandated by state law or undertaken with
segregative intent by the school board, have resulted in a present
condition of racial segregation, then the segregation is de jure rather
than de facto, 59 regardless of how long ago the actions occurred. As
the Court has stated: "If the actions of the school authorities were to
any degree motivated by segregative intent and the segregation result-
ing from those actions continues to exist, the fact of remoteness in time
certainly does not make these actions any less 'intentional."' 60
the view that the government could use race-conscious criteria in legislative districting
in order to ensure "a fair allocation of political power between white and non-white
voters." See pp. 159-60 infra.
S6 98 S. Ct. at 2757 (Powell, J.).
-17 See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). See also 98
S. Ct. at 2785-86 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.); Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 200 n.II (1973).
58 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 205-06 (1973).
60 Id. at 210- I1. In desegregation cases involving school districts in states where
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The problem of overcoming the continuing effects of identified
discrimination also arises in the employment discrimination cases.
Where an employer, private or public, has been found to have engaged
in past racial discrimination in hiring or promotions,6 1 courts can order
an affirmative hiring or promotional remedy by which the employer
must hire or promote a specified proportion of black workers before
white workers who otherwise might be preferred. 62
segregation was required by state law prior to Brown, the courts look to the continued
existence and racial composition of schools antedating Brown. If a substantial number
of pre-Brown schools have retained their pre-Brown racial composition, the system is
considered still to be practicing de jure segregation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Since the system has thereby retained its dual
character, the school board is charged not only with the affirmative duty of desegregat-
ing the pre-Brown schools, but also with the affirmative duty of preventing other
schools from becoming racially identifiable. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v.
Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 930-31 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418
U.S. 918 (1974), reinstated, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
931 (1975). The entire system must be desegregated, and the desegregation plan must
achieve the "greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the
practicalities of the situation." Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37
(1971).
In desegregation cases involving school districts in states where segregation was
not required by state law prior to Brown, the courts look to actions of the school board
that were contributory causes of the schools' becoming racially distinct. Once a school
has become racially identifiable as a result of intentional segregatory actions of the
school board, the board is under an affirmative duty to desegregate that school. See
Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
When the board has practiced intentional racial segregation with respect to a substan-
tial part of the school system, courts will assume that segregation in the remaining
parts of the system was also due to the board's intentional segregatory acts. If that
presumption cannot be rebutted, systemwide relief is mandated. Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); cf. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406
(1977) (systemwide remedy unjustified absent finding that segregative intent has had
systemwide impact).
The Supreme Court will consider the matter of systemwide relief again this Term
in Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3463 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1979) (No. 78-610), and in Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583
F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1979) (No. 78-627).
61 Racial discrimination by state governmental employers, of course, violates the
fourteenth amendment. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1976) proscribe racial discrimination by federal, state, and private employers.
62 See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert.
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The rationale for affirmative hiring and promotional remedies
cannot be explained solely on the ground that they are designed to put
identified victims of past discrimination in their "rightful place." 63 As
the Brennan group noted in Bakke: "Such relief does not require as a
predicate proof that recipients of preferential advancement have been
individually discriminated against; it is enough that each recipient is
within a general class of persons likely to have been the victims of
discrimination." 64 Preferential treatment can also be given to persons
who never even applied for a job if they can show that they were
deterred from doing so by the employer's known discriminatory prac-
tices .65 What may really be involved here, then, is the interest of
blacks as a group in having a "fair share" of an employer's jobs: the
affirmative hiring or promotion remedy is imposed at least in part as a
means of remedying the present effect of the employer's past discrimi-
nation on the employment interests of blacks as a group. 66 The "disa-
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). The same kind of remedy can be ordered for the benefit
of other protected groups, such as ethnic minorities, religious minorities, and women.
See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 3145 (1978).
It should be noted that the adverse impact of such a hiring-and-promotion remedy
on white workers is the same as it would be if the employer in question undertook the
program voluntarily, without a finding of identified discrimination. See 98 S. Ct. at
2786-87 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.); p. 166 infra. See also
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315,330 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
But see Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977)
(employer could not, consistent with Title VII, voluntarily undertake an affirmative
action program unless supported by governmental finding of past discrimination
against minority workers), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 720 (1978) (Nos. 78-432, 78-
435 & 78-436).
63 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (remedy awarding
retroactive seniority necessary to put victims of discrimination in "rightful place" as
employees).
64 98 S. Ct. at 2786 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.); see Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357-62 (1977).
6- International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362-67
(1977).
66 The notion that a group as an entity can have rights to distributive and compen-
satory justice has been the subject of considerable academic debate. Professor Fiss has
argued that any group constituting a "perpetual underclass" is entitled to relief as a
group. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 151
(1976). Professor Van Dyke maintains that the same principles governing individual
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bling effects of identified discrimination" in employment are felt by
blacks as a group, and pervasive employment discrimination has con-
tributed greatly to the depressed economic situation of blacks in com-
parison with that of whites. In order to overcome those effects and to
give blacks a "fair share" of the employer's jobs, the courts appear to
have been fairly lenient in finding a connection between the
employer's past discrimination and "injury" to the specific recipients
of preferential treatment. 67 Whether they accept the group interest
rationale or not, the courts in these cases are "'eliminating or ame-
liorating" the present consequences of past employment discrimina-
tion against blacks as a group by imposing affirmative hiring and
promotional remedies, and the use of race-conscious criteria advances
a valid and substantial governmental interest.
It follows by analogy that if a publicly supported university were
found by a court to have practiced past discrimination in determining
admission to its professional schools, a court could order an affirma-
tive admissions program involving racial preference. Again, as Justice
Powell observed in Bakke: "After such findings have been made, the
governmental interest in preferring members of the injured groups at
the expense of others is substantial, since the legal rights of the victims
must be vindicated." ' 68 As in the employment cases, it would be
expected that the courts, in order to overcome the "disabling effects of
identified discrimination," would be fairly lenient in finding "vic-
rights to equality and justice may be extended to a group as an entity. Van Dyke,
Justice as Fairness: For Groups?, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 607 (1975).
Professor Brest, on the other hand, argues that a theory of group rights is contrary
to the underlying political theory of American society: liberalism, or the rights of
individuals. Any recognition of group interests has the sole purpose of vindicating the
rights of the group's individual members. Brest rejects as morally and philosophically
untenable the idea that "an act of discrimination is a wrong to the 'group,' and that
• . . redress is appropriately made to any member of the group regardless of his or her
personal injuries." Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51 (1976).
Although the debate continues, the author finds the general theory of group
interests persuasive. See Sedler, Racial Preference, supra note 8, at 372-80.
67 The courts appear to be stricter in finding such a connection when individual-
ized relief, such as retroactive seniority awards and back pay, is sought. See Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 435 U.S. at 371-74; Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co.,
583 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1978).
68 98 S. Ct. at 2758 (Powell, J.).
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tims" of that discrimination. The burden would be on the university to
show that an applicant who had applied and was rejected would not
have been admitted in the absence of the discriminatory policy, 69 and
it should not be difficult to find "qualified" applicants who were
"deterred" from applying because of that policy. A "rightful place"
argument might even be made in some cases: If past discrimination
were shown, it would not matter whether the beneficiaries of the
remedy - that is, the very individuals excluded in the past - con-
tinued to be objectively admissible; their admission would be neces-
sary to put them in the place that they would have occupied if the past
discrimination had not occurred.
As in the employment cases, however, what would really be
involved would be the interest of blacks in having a "fair share" of the
available places in the university's professional schools. If the univer-
sity were found to have practiced discrimination in its admissions
policies, it should be required to give black applicants a "fair share"
of the currently available places in order to overcome the "disabling
effects of identified discrimination" that have contributed to denying
blacks access to the professions. In this regard, the "preferred" appli-
cants, like the "preferred" workers who receive the jobs or promo-
tions in the employment situation, should be seen as the representa-
tives of blacks as a group, and it should not matter whether they
themselves are "identified" victims of the past discrimination. 70
69 Here the analogy may be extended to the employment discrimination cases.
Where the employer is found to be practicing a policy of discrimination, the burden is
on the employer to show that a particular job applicant would not have been hired in
the absence of that discriminatory policy. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 772 (1975). In Bakke, the California Supreme Court held that the burden was on
the University to prove that Bakke would not have been admitted if the special
admissions program had not been in effect, and the University did not try to sustain
that burden. See 98 S. Ct. at 2743-44 (Powell, J.).
70 Another point of difference between Justice Powell and the Brennan group in
Bakke was over the question whether the University could make a finding that it had
been guilty of past discrimination. Compare 98 S. Ct. at 2758-59 (Powell, J.), with
id. at 2787 n.42 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) Justice Powell is
correct, however, when he notes that the University did not purport to have made such
a finding. Id. at 2758 (Powell, J.). At trial, the University did not introduce evidence
showing that it had practiced racial discrimination during the first two years of its
operation, and the lower court had refused to allow parties to intervene for the purpose
of introducing such evidence. See pp. 166-68 infra.
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This Article has pointed out three manifestations of the social
history of racism which can be traced to identified discrimination and
which, as a result, the government has a valid and substantial interest
in eliminating: (1) school segregation, (2) employment discrimina-
tion, 71 and (3) discrimination in admission to publicly supported uni-
versities. This identified discrimination should be seen as causing
injury to the interests of blacks as a group, apart from the injury
caused to particular victims; and group-oriented remedies, involving
the use of race-conscious criteria, should be employed to overcome the
existing effects of that discrimination.
Another aspect of the problem of remedying the present conse-
quences of identified past discrimination is the question whether the
identified discrimination must have been that of the governmental
entity which acts or is required to act to remedy those consequences.
There is no logical or policy reason why this should be so, as long as
the identified discrimination can be traced to illegal action on the part
of a governmental entity. In the area of school segregation, for exam-
ple, we have seen that the courts have looked to the present conse-
quences of past action by school boards. Suppose, however, that in a
state where segregation was not required by law prior to Brown, a
school board is not shown to have engaged in intentional segregatory
acts. 72 It has simply followed geographical attendance zoning without
any racially motivated alterations or use of optional zones, but because
of patterns of residential racial segregation, there are a large number of
racially identifiable schools within the district. Since neither state law
nor school board action produced these racially identifiable schools,
the condition of school segregation is said to be de facto rather than de
jure and thus is not unconstitutional. 73 But suppose also that it can be
shown that patterns of residential racial segregation were caused in
substantial part by the intentional, racially discriminatory action of
71 The governmental interest is the same whether agencies of the government are
acting to remedy their own prior discrimination, or whether the courts or administra-
tive tribunals are acting to remedy the discrimination of private entities subject to
antidiscrimination laws.
72 See Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
13 See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966);
Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 1027
(1972).
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government agencies at all levels, such as denial of FHA financing for
blacks to obtain housing in white residential areas; enforcement of
racial restrictive covenants; discriminatory zoning practices; segrega-
ted operation of public housing; and the like.74 Since school segrega-
tion admittedly results from residential racial patterns, and since those
residential patterns have been brought about in substantial part by
intentional, racially discriminatory actions on the part of the govern-
ment, the question arises whether the school segregation itself is un-
constitutional. 75
The issue of governmental responsibility for racial residential
segregation as it affects school segregation has arisen primarily in the
context of prescribing an interdistrict remedy 76 in order to eliminate a
condition of de jure segregation found to exist in an urban school
district. In Milliken v. Bradley J77 Justice Stewart, whose vote was
necessary to the decision, expressly stated that an interdistrict remedy
might be appropriate, "[w]ere it to be shown, for example, that state
officials had contributed to the separation of the races. . . by purpose-
ful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws. '" 78 In
Evans v. Buchanan,79 the three-judge district court relied on govern-
mental responsibility for residential racial patterns in the Wilmington
metropolitan area as one of the reasons for the imposition of an inter-
district remedy between Wilmington, Delaware, and the suburban
school districts,80 and its decision was summarily affirmed by the
Supreme Court. 8 '
The question of imputation - the extent to which one govern-
mental unit can be held responsible for the intentional racial discrimi-
nation practiced by another governmental unit - was fully considered
74 See Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027, 1027 n.*(Douglas, J., dissenting).
75 This question is currently being litigated in Bell v. Board of Educ., No.
C78-20A (N.D. Ohio, filed Jan. 13, 1978).
76 An interdistrict remedy applies not only to a school district found to have
discriminated, but also to surrounding districts whose inclusion in a desegration plan is
necessary to remedy effectively the segregation existing in the district found to have
discriminated.
77 418 U.S. 754 (1974).
78 Id. at 755.
79 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), affdmem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
80 Id. at 434-35, 447.
81 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
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by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Board of School Commis-
sioners,82 which involved the imposition of an interdistrict remedy in
the Indianapolis metropolitan area. In holding that an interdistrict rem-
edy could be imposed because of governmental responsibility for
urban-suburban racial residential patterns, the court stated:
The commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed
at the state and cannot be avoided by a fragmentation of
responsibility among various agents. If the state has contrib-
uted to the separation of the races, it has the obligation to
remedy the constitutional violations. That remedy may in-
clude school districts which are its instrumentalities and
which were the product of the violation. Thus, if state dis-
criminatory housing practices have a substantial interdistrict
effect, it is appropriate to require school authorities to rem-
edy the effects even though they did not themselves cause
this aspect of school segregation.83
The same reasoning would apply to governmental responsibility for
residential racial patterns that resulted in school segregation within a
school district. 84 While a discussion of the proposition that govern-
mental responsibility for residential racial segregation renders the re-
sulting school segregation de jure rather than de facto is beyond the
scope of the present writing,85 the proposition does suggest that the
use of race-conscious criteria to remedy identifiable past discrimina-
tion may be required on the part of a governmental agency that has not
itself engaged in such discrimination.
The same idea, considered in the context of race-conscious ad-
missions programs at a publicly supported university, leads to the
question whether it would have been relevant in Bakke if a number of
public school systems in California having a substantial minority pop-
82 573 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1978).
83 Id. at 410 (citation omitted).
84 Cf. Holland v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 258 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958) (where
city ordinance required residential racial segregation, resulting school segregation was
unconstitutional).
85 The proposition has been outlined in Sedler, Discussion of Papers, 10 URB.
REV. 149, 153-54 (1978).
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ulation were found to have been practicing de jure segregation.8 6 If
racially segregated education is indeed "inherently unequal," '87 and
unequal in the sense of inferior,8 8 then black applicants to the Davis
Medical School as a group would have received inferior educational
opportunities in comparison with white applicants as a group; the
inferiority could have contributed to the blacks' generally lower test
scores. 89 If a publicly supported university were to give preference to
black applicants who received a substantial part of their education in
school systems that had been found by the courts to have been practic-
ing de jure segregation,9" then the university would be "ameliorating
. . . the disabling effects of identified discrimination, '" 91 for the bene-
fit of the identified victims, not merely for the benefit of the group.
86 The California Supreme Court has rejected the dejure/defacto distinction, and
has held that all racial segregation is harmful to minority children, so that school
boards in that state have an affirmative obligation to eliminate actual segregation. See
Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 289-302, 551 P.2d 28, 33-42, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 729-38 (1976). In Bakke, the Brennan group noted that "[j]udicial decrees
recognizing discrimination in public education in California testify to the fact of
widespread discrimination suffered by California-born minority applicants." 98 S. Ct.
at 2790 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). Some of these decrees were
issued by federal courts, indicating that at least some of the segregation in the Califor-
nia public schools would be found to be de jure under federal standards. See, e.g.,
Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 386 F. Supp. 539 (C.D. Cal. 1974);
Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970). The
Brennan group also noted that many minority group applicants living in California
received their education in school districts in southern states that were practicing de
jure segregation during that period. 98 S. Ct. at 2790 (Brennan, White, Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ.).
87 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
88 Id. at 494.
89 The great majority of current black applicants to professional school have
probably received a substantial part of their primary and secondary education in
schools judicially determined to be de jure segregated, and it is reasonable to conclude
that the "inherently unequal" education received has impaired their ability to compete
with white applicants as a group for the available seats. See Sedler, Racial Preference,
supra note 8, at 351-55.
90 This could be done by adding a number of points to such a black applicant's
overall score, and comparing his or her adjusted overall score with the overall score of
all the other applicants. Presumably this would satisfy Justice Powell's concern that all
applicants must be permitted to compete for all available seats. 98 S. Ct. at 2764
(Powell, J.).
91 Id. at 2757.
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Furthermore, this should satisfy Justice Powell's requirement of a
"judical determination of constitutional violation as a predicate for the
formulation of a remedial classification." '9 2 Consequently, the
university's action would not run afoul of Justice Powell's objections
to the use of race-conscious criteria. There would seem to be no
constitutional objection to giving de jure segregation "bonus points"
to those black applicants as part of the "competitive consideration of
race and ethnic origin, ' 93 despite the fact that the governmental entity
providing the remedy was different from the entity found to have
discriminated. It seems fair to conclude that the past discrimination
need be only that of some governmental agency, and not necessarily
that of the agency employing race-conscious criteria.
Insofar as the social history of racism is reflected in identified
discrimination by the government or by private entities legally prohibi-
ted from engaging in such discrimination, the government has a valid
and substantial interest in eliminating the present consequences of that
discrimination. Where the government itself has engaged in identified
past discrimination, it has an affirmative duty to take action to over-
come the discrimination's continuing effects. 94 Because overcoming
the present consequences of identified past discrimination is so clearly
a valid and substantial governmental interest, litigative efforts must
continue to focus on proving past discrimination. To the extent that
those efforts are successful, we will have come some distance toward
the goal of eliminating the persistent effects of racism in this country.
Nonetheless, in order to cover the remaining distance, we must make it
equally clear that the government has an overriding interest in revers-
ing the present effects of past discrimination that is not specifically
identified.
IV. THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF RACISM AND
THE EQUAL PARTICIPATION OBJECTIVE
The central thesis of this Article is that the government is consti-
tutionally permitted to use race-conscious criteria in an appropriate
92 Id. at 2754.
93 Id. at 2764.
94 Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). See also 98 S. Ct. at
2785-86 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
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way whenever the use of such criteria is necessary to advance the
objective of providing equal participation for blacks in the benefits of
American life, and thus to redress the present consequences of the
social history of racism which have denied them such participation. 95
It is clear, as the prior discussion indicates, that the admittedly valid
and substantial governmental interest in "ameliorating, or eliminating
where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination
' 96
essentially involves overcoming the present consequences of particular
aspects of the social history of racism. If the government may constitu-
tionally be required to take action involving the use of race-conscious
criteria in order to redress the present effects of its identified past
discrimination, there is no logical reason why it should not be permit-
ted to take such action in order to eliminate the present effects of such
discrimination by the society as a whole. It is this thesis that now will
be developed more fully.
A. The Goal of a Racially Equal Society
Providing equal participation for blacks in all of the benefits of
American life advances the goal of a racially equal society. That this is
a constitutionally permissible goal is evident from the broad, organic
purpose of the fourteenth amendment and the other Reconstruction
Amendments, taken as a whole. As one commentator has observed:
[T]he main thrust of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments was the construction of a penumbra of
legal commands which were designed to raise the race of
freedmen from the status of inferior beings - a status im-
posed by the system of chattel slavery - to that of free men
and women, equal participants in the hitherto white political
community consisting of the "people of the United States."
The constitutional right of the black race to this status of
9' In Bakke, four Justices were of the view that redressing the effects of the social
history of racism advanced a valid and substantial interest. 98 S. Ct. at 2785-89
(Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). Justice Powell indicated that it did not,
id. at 2757-59 (Powell, J.), and the remaining Justices did not pass on the question,
id. at 2809-15 (Stevens, J.).
916 Id. at 2757 (Powell, J.).
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freedom was the simple and central objective of the Recon-
struction Amendments. 97
The Supreme Court recognized the constitutional significance of black
freedom when it upheld the power of Congress, under the implement-
ing clause of the thirteenth amendment, to prohibit racial discrimina-
tion by private persons which constitutes "badges and incidents of
slavery."98
Given the present effects of past discrimination, a racially equal
society is not possible until blacks enjoy a degree of participation in
American society roughly equal to that enjoyed by whites. As we have
seen, the present system of prevention has not and cannot overcome
the persistent effects of our long and tragic history of racism. 99 A
racially equal society cannot be attained unless affirmative measures
are taken to increase blacks' participation in all aspects of American
life. And since the objective is a racial one, race-conscious criteria
should ordinarily be considered an appropriate means to achieve it.
From this perspective, it seems illogical and unsound to distin-
guish between those aspects of the social history of racism that can be
traced to identified discrimination on the part of governmental and
private entities, and those that cannot. What Justice Powell called
"societal discrimination" is nothing more than an accumulation of
wrongs on the part of governmental and private entities that cannot be
identified with particularity at the present time. But their consequences
are no less enduring because they cannot be so identified. The non-
identifiable nature of the discrimination does not obviate the
government's valid and substantial interest in redressing its conse-
quences. It merely converts that interest from a constitutionally man-
dated to a constitutionally permissible one.
B. The Helpful Cases
While the Supreme Court has not yet recognized the broad thesis
of this Article, there are Supreme Court and lower federal court cases
97 Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REv.
388 (1967).
98 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-44 (1968). See also
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Sedler, Racial Preference, supra note 8,
at 366-67.
99 See pp. 136-39 supra.
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that support the constitutionality of using race-conscious criteria in an
appropriate way to advance the equal participation objective and the
goal of a racially equal society. In Bakke itself, Justice Powell, impli-
citly joined on this point by the Brennan group, took the position that
the University's interest in achieving an educationally diverse student
body was a valid and substantial governmental interest, justifying the
use of race-conscious admissions criteria. 100 In this regard Bakke
appears to be but a slight extension of Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,101 where the Court expressly
stated that school boards could use race-conscious criteria to achieve
integration even to the point of requiring that "each school should
have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the pro-
portion for the district as a whole."' 2 The extension, however, is not
without significance. When a public school system acts voluntarily to
achieve integration, no white children, of course, are denied admission
to the schools. The "detriment" they suffer is in being unable to
attend the "neighborhood school."' 1 3 The use of race-conscious ad-
missions criteria to achieve integration in a university's professional
school, on the other hand, does deny admission to some white appli-
cants, who in this sense suffer substantially greater "detriment" than
the public school children bused away from the "neighborhood
school," as Justice Powell very carefully noted in Bakke. 104 Nonethe-
less, assuming that the integration objective has been achieved by
10  See note 49 supra.
101 402 U.S. 1(1971).
102 Id. at 16. Strictly speaking, the statement was dictum, since the case did not
involve a direct challenge to the constitutionality of voluntary integration. Nonethe-
less, the dictum has been accepted as authoritative, and it in effect affirms a long line
of lower federal and state decisions upholding the constitutionality of integration
programs voluntarily undertaken by school boards or required by state law. See
Sedler, Book Review, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 647-48 (1977). See also 98 S. Ct. at
2786 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710
(W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
103 Justice Powell, it majbe noted, considers this to be a "detriment" of some
significance. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 243-50 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
104 *'Petitioner did not arrange for respondent to attend a different medical school
in order to desegregate Davis Medical School; instead it denied him admission and
may have deprived him altogether of a medical education." 98 S. Ct. at 2754 n.39
(Powell, J.). See also Sedler, Racial Preference, supra note 8, at 362-63.
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appropriate means,105 Justice Powell did not find that the resulting
denial of admission to a white applicant amounted to "unequal treat-
ment under the Fourteenth Amendment." 1 0 6
Both Bakke and Swann, then, support the proposition that
achieving racial integration is a valid and substantial governmental
interest. Given that proposition, the government may require that any
program it operates be administered on an integrated basis. A public
housing authority could, for example, assign persons to its housing on
a racial basis in order to ensure that all of the sites would be racially
integrated.10 7 The same integration objective renders fully constitu-
tional the federal government's efforts to require recipients of federal
funds, such as colleges and universities, to achieve genuine integration
of their faculties and student bodies, and federal contractors of their
workforces. 108
The appropriate use of race-conscious criteria to advance the
equal participation goal was also found constitutional in United Jewish
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey.10 9 The Court, al-
though fragmented, upheld the use of race-conscious criteria in legisla-
tive districting in order to "achieve a fair allocation of political power
between white and non-white voters." 10 Although in that case there
was a question of eliminating the consequences of past racial discrimi-
nation in legislative districting, the lineup of the Court there, coupled
with the lineup of the Court in Bakke, supports the proposition that
equal participation in the political process is a valid and substantial
governmental interest. Justices White, Stevens, and Rehnquist ex-
105 Justice Powell concluded that it had not been in Bakke. 98 S. Ct. at 2764
(Powell, J.).
106 Id. at 2763. As he noted, "The denial to respondent of this right to indivi-
dualized consideration without regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner's
special admissions program." Id. n.52.
107 See Otero v. New York Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973). It
should be noted that achieving the integration objective in this context, as in the school
desegregation context, may cause the same "detriment" to blacks as to whites. In
Otero the "detriment" was a delay in obtaining publicly assisted housing until a
vacancy suitable for the race of the applicant was available.
308 Some of these efforts are described in the appendices to the Brief of the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct.
2733 (1978).
309 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
110 Id. at 167.
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pressly approved the "fair allocation of political power" objective,
totally without regard to past discrimination. "' Justices Brennan and
Blackmun focused on remedying past discrimination without reaching
the "equal participation" issue.1 2 Justice Marshall did not partici-
pate.' 3 Given the views of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun in Bakke, it is reasonable to conclude that they would have agreed
with the position of Justices White, Stevens, and Rehnquist in Wil-
liamsburgh, had they addressed the equal participation question raised
in that case. It can therefore be argued that Williamsburgh stands for
the proposition that achieving a "fair allocation of political power
between white and non-white voters" - equal participation in the
political process - is a valid and substantial governmental interest,
justifying the use of race-conscious criteria. 114
Another valid and substantial governmental interest, according to
an unbroken line of federal circuit decisions, is racial minorities' equal
participation in the "governmental market." Under federal regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 11246, federal contrac-
tors are required to take "affirmative action" in order to ensure speci-
fied proportions of minority workers in their workforces. 15 In Con-
tractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of La-
Ir' Id. at 165-68.
IZ Both Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined in all sections of Justice White's
opinion except the section dealing with the equal participation objective. Id. at 147.
Justice Brennan filed a separate concurring opinion in which he elaborated his reasons
for approving the race-conscious remedy at issue. Id. at 168-79 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
113 For a more detailed discussion of Williamsburgh, see Sedler, Racial Pref-
erence, supra note 8, at 381-84.
114 In Bakke, however, Justice Powell explained Williamsburgh as a case in
which "the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed mea-
sures to improve the previously disadvantaged group's ability to participate, without
excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant
opportunity - meaningful participation in the electoral process." 98 S. Ct. at 2756
(Powell, J.). The Brennan group, to the contrary, saw Williamsburgh as a case in
which (1) there had been no judicial finding of discrimination by the entity employing
race-conscious criteria, and (2) there was detriment to another group, since the district-
ing deprived Hasidic Jews of their prior voting-bloc strength. Id. at 2786-87 (Bren-
nan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
115 The regulations are set out at length in Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of
Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 162-64 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
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bor, 116 the Third Circuit upheld, over fifth amendment "equal protec-
tion" objections, the "Philadelphia Plan," which imposed on federal
contractors in the five-county Philadelphia metropolitan area detailed
requirements as to minority hiring. The court emphasized that it was
irrelevant that the affected contractors had not been shown to have
discriminated against blacks.117 Since the federal government had a
"cost and performance" interest in the construction projects, it could
require that minority workers be included in the labor pool. 118
The federal contract cases involve a governmental interest be-
yond the economic one. Executive Order 11246 is an attempt by the
federal government to overcome the present effects of a particular
aspect of our society's history of racism: The major objective of the
Executive Order is that of equal participation. Blacks historically had
been excluded from the construction trades, and Executive Order
11246 was designed to ensure that they participate fairly in the eco-
nomic benefits resulting from federal construction projects. 119 In Con-
tractors Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps,120 the Third
Circuit again indicated that it was constitutional for Congress to re-
quire that minority contractors receive a proportion of the contracts
financed with federal grants. 12 1 According to the court, the "set-
aside" contained in the Local Public Works Capital Development and
116 Id. at 176-77.
117 Id. at 176. In Bakke, Justice Powell interpreted Contractors Ass'n as a case
involving an administrative finding of past discrimination by the industries affected.
98 S. Ct. at 2754-55 (Powell, J.). The Third Circuit, however, shortly before Bakke
was decided, referred to Contractors as a case in which "[w]e upheld the remedial use
of racial employment 'goals' by the executive without a prior adjudication that dis-
crimination existed." Contractors Ass'n v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 816 (3d Cir. 1978).
118 442 F.2d at 177. In addition, the federal government should be permitted to
advance the racial integration objective with respect to the activities of recipients of
federal contracts, just as it may with respect to the activities it engages in itself. See
pp. 158-59 supra.
119 See generally Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study on the Dynamics of
Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 723 (1972). Neither the Executive Order nor
the implementing regulations require that the minority workers who are hired be
identifiable victims of past discrimination either by the employer or by the "industry."
120 573 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1978).
M21 The case arose on an appeal from the district court's denial of a preliminary
injunction against the operation of the program, 441 F. Supp. 936 (W.D. Pa. 1977),
and the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were not likely to
succeed on the merits, 573 F.2d at 818.
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Investment Act of 1976122 was designed to 'begin to redress' what
Congress perceived to be the continuing economic impact of racial
discrimination" and to encourage minority businesses. 12 3 The states
have a similar interest in providing for full participation by racial
minorities in the labor pools of state governmental contractors, and the
constitutionality of state "Philadelphia Plans" has likewise been sus-
tained. 124
To summarize the results of the Supreme Court and lower federal
court cases, it appears that the following are valid and substantial
governmental interests, justifying the use of race-conscious criteria:1 25
integration of governmentally operated facilities and institutions; equal
participation of racial minorities in the political process; and equal
participation of racial minorities in the "governmental marketplace."
All of these interests, however, are merely particular instances of the
general governmental interest in providing equal participation for
blacks in American life. If these interests are considered valid and
substantial enough to justify the use of race-conscious criteria, it is
122 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (1976).
123 573 F.2d at 817. After Bakke, the Second Circuit also upheld the constitu-
tionality of the "set-aside," but was careful to bring it within the ambit of "remedying
past discrimination." Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), petition for
cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1978) (No. 78-1007). The Fullilove
court pointed out that in Bakke Justice Powell had noted Congress' special compe-
tence to make findings of past discrimination, and the court found that "[i]t is also
beyond dispute that the set-aside was intended to remedy past discrimination." Id. at
604. Prior to. Bakke, the Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion. Ohio Contractors
Ass'n v. Economic Dev. Admin. 580 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1978). In Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 47 U.S.L.W. 2290 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20,
1978)(on remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration of issue of mootness in
light of Bakke, see 98 S. Ct. 3132, 3133 (1978)), the court found that the case was not
moot, and it adhered to its prior ruling of unconstitutionality, see 441 F. Supp. 955
(C.D. Cal. 1977), this time on the ground that "[t]he 10 percent race quota was not a
constitutionally acceptable means of promoting the Congress' legitimate interest in
promoting employment in the construction industry among minority group members."
47 U.S.L.W. at 2290.
124 See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (Ist Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Southern Ill.Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d
680 (7th Cir. 1972).
12s Of course, the use of race-conscious criteria-must still be an "appropriate"
means, under all the relevant circumstances, of advancing the governmental objective.
See note 49 supra.
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difficult to see why the general equal participation interest should not
be found to be valid and substantial as well.
C. Objections to the Use of Race-Conscious
Criteria to Advance the Equal Participation
Objective - A Constitutional Inquiry
This Article has argued that the goal of providing equal participa-
tion for blacks in all aspects of American life is consistent with the
broad, organic purpose of the fourteenth amendment and of the Recon-
struction Amendments as a whole. 126 It has also shown in the preced-
ing section that the Supreme Court and the federal circuits have upheld
the use of race-conscious criteria in particular instances related to the
advancement of the equal participation objective. If the government
cannot use racial criteria in an appropriate way to advance the same
objective in all instances, and to overcome the present consequences of
all aspects of the social history of racism, then it must be because some
other constitutional principle renders the use of race-conscious criteria
for so broad a purpose impermissible. The Article now turns its in-
quiry to whether such a principle exists.
In Bakke, Justice Powell expressed two primary concerns which
led him to conclude that the goal of redressing the present conse-
quences of "societal discrimination" was not a governmental interest
of sufficient importance to justify the University's use of race-
conscious admissions criteria. His first concern was that a program
which gave preference to members of a minority group would have an
unjustifiable, adverse impact on other individual applicants.1 27 His
second concern was that the concept of societal discrimination was too
"amorphous" and too dependent on political forces to provide a prin-
cipled basis for determining which minority groups would receive
special consideration. 128 It is submitted that neither concern renders
126 See p. 157 supra.
127 98 S. Ct. at 2753, 2758 (Powell, J.).
128 Id. at 2751 & n.36, 2757. In Justice Powell's words, to find a governmental
interest in reversing societal discrimination "would be to convert a remedy heretofore
reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the
Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of
societal discrimination." Id. at 2759.
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the goal of redressing the present consequences of "societal discrimi-
nation" constitutionally impermissible.
Whenever a governmental entity adopts a race-conscious remedy
in order to redress the persistent ill effects of past discrimination, that
entity advances the group interest of blacks in their equal participation
in society. 129 Advancement of the interests of blacks as a group admit-
tedly has an adverse impact on the interests of individual whites, who
are compelled to give up certain benefits that they otherwise would
have received. ' 30 The initial question, therefore, is whether advancing
the equal participation interest of blacks as a group, for the purpose of
eliminating the consequences of the social history of racism, is uncon-
stitutional because it has an adverse impact on the interests of indivi-
dual whites. 13'
In Bakke, Justice Powell put a great deal of emphasis on the
importance of individual interests. As he noted, the "rights created by
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are by its terms,
guaranteed to the individual,"'' 32 and "it is the individual who is
entitled to judicial protection against classifications based on his racial
or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon personal
rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a
particular group.' ' 33 Finally, there is a "measure of inequity in forc-
ing innocent persons . . . to bear the burdens of redressing grievances
not of their making." 134 But Justice Powell made those statements in
129 See pp. 148-50 supra. In United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc.
v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), the interest at stake was the "fair allocation of
political power between white and non-white voters." Id. at 167. In Bakke, the group
interest at stake was equal representation within the medical profession.
130 In the employment context, individual whites suffer decreased chances of
being hired or promoted. See pp. 147-48 supra. In school desegregation, some
individuals are deprived of the advantage of attending neighborhood schools. See
p. 158 supra. In United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430
U.S. 144 (1977), the adverse impact was on the members of the Hasidic Jewish
community, who suffered dilution of their bloc-voting strength. In Bakke, individual
whites suffered decreased chances of admission to medical school.
131 It is settled that whites as a group have no legitimate interest in maintaining
their position of societal dominance. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
132 98 S. Ct. at 2748 (Powell, J.).
133 Id. at 2753.
134 Id. The Brennan group, by contrast, did not see the inequity. Since the
special admissions program was, in their view, a proper method of dealing with the
present consequences of the social history of racism, Allan Bakke, who was in effect a
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the context of holding that the use of race-conscious criteria was sub-
ject to "strict scrutiny," not that its use was impermissible whenever it
had an adverse impact on the interests of individual whites. Indeed, as
Justice Powell concluded, what the individual was entitled to was no
more than a "judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear
on that basis [the use of race-conscious criteria] is precisely tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest."1 35
Given that conclusion, the adverse impact on the interests of
individual whites resulting from the use of race-conscious criteria does
not of itself render the use of such criteria unconstitutional, nor does it
furnish any guidance in determining whether the use of such criteria
advances a valid and substantial governmental interest. ' 6 When Jus-
tice Powell held that integration of the medical school's student body
amounted to such an interest, he necessarily held that it could be
advanced at the expense of those white applicants who were excluded
from the medical school as a result. Ultimately, the only protection for
the potentially excluded white applicant is that the University must
advance the governmental interest by what the court finds to be appro-
priate means.
Thus, the adverse impact on the interests of individual whites
resulting from the use of race-conscious criteria is constitutionally
irrelevant to the validity and substantiality of the governmental inter-
est. Racial criteria may be used in an appropriate way whenever their
use advances an interest otherwise found to be suffciently important,
such as overcoming the disabling effects of identified discrimina-
tion, 137 providing equal participation for minorities in the political
process 138 and in the "governmental market,"' 139 or integrating gov-
beneficiary of that social history, had no cause to complain: "If. . .the failure of
minorities to qualify for admission at Davis under regular procedures was due princi-
pally to the effects of past discrimination, then there is a reasonable likelihood that, but
for pervasive racial discrimination, respondent would have failed to quality for admis-
sion even in the absence of Davis' special admissions program." Id. at 2787 (Bren-
nan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
135 Id. at 2753 (Powell, J.).
136 It may, however, be a factor in determining if the race-conscious program in
question is an appropriate means of advancing the government's interest. See note 49
supra.
'37 See pp. 146-51 supra.
'38 See pp. 159-60 supra.
'39 See pp. 160-62 supra.
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ernmentally operated facilities and institutions.' 40 Indeed, in all in-
stances where the use of racial criteria has been upheld, it has had an
adverse impact on individual whites. 141 Once it has been shown that a
race-conscious program's adverse impact on whites is not determina-
tive of the constitutional issues, the only relevant question is whether
the equal participation objective - or "couhtering the effects of soci-
etal discrimination," as the University phrased it142 - is a valid and
substantial governmental interest.
Justice Powell answered that question in the negative primarily
because of his concern over the "amorphous" and "ageless" defini-
tion of "societal discrimination.' ' 43 He did not feel that the term
could be given a clear, constant meaning that could form the basis of a
predictable system of providing benefits to disadvantaged minori-
ties. 144 He insisted that there was no constitutionally significant gov-
ernmental interest at stake, absent some finding of specific, identifi-
able discrimination. ' 45
The concept of "societal discrimination" is neither "amor-
phous" nor "ageless" when tied to the history of racism in this coun-
try. The nation's problem of racism against blacks has been more
persistent and more critical than problems of discrimination against
other groups. Because blacks' resulting disadvantages can therefore be
differentiated, there is a reasonable constitutional basis for concluding
that blacks may be given special treatment while other minorities need
not be. 146
Even more important, the "amorphousness" of "societal dis-
crimination" is no greater than that of some supposedly "identified
discrimination" contained in legislative findings. The opinion asserts
that "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional
or statutory violations" are of sufficient importance to justify appro-
priate use of race-conscious criteria to ameliorate the consecjuences of
140 See pp. 158-59 supra.
141 See note 130 supra.
142 98 S. Ct. at 2757 (Powell, J.).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 2751-53.
145 Id. at 2757-58.
146 See generally Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581, 584-603 (1977). See also pp.
136-39 & notes 11-28 supra.
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those violations, even though individual whites might thereby be dis-
advantaged. 147 By recognizing the ability of legislative bodies to
make such findings and to promulgate race-conscious programs, Jus-
tice Powell implicitly recognized that the findings of "constitutional or
statutory violations" need not be made with a great degree of particu-
larity concerning specific instances of misconduct, for in general it is
the function of legislative bodies to make determinations of policy
rather than to make adjudicatory findings of fact. Whenever a legisla-
tive body makes findings of constitutional or statutory violations in the
context of racial discrimination, the findings are likely to be genera-
lized rather than based on particular instances of violations. 148
147 98 S. Ct. at 2757-58 (Powell, J.).
148 For example, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976),
requires, in some instances, that state governments take race into account when
implementing legislative reapportionments. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). The Act was a broad remedial
measure designed to "banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting." South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). The congressional findings on
which the Act was based were very broad, amounting essentially to findings of
widespread (or "societal") discrimination against blacks in voter registration. See
H. R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-16 (1965); S. REP. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-16 (1965). Moreover, the criterion for triggering application of the
Act against any state or subdivision of a state is the Attorney General's determination
that as of November 1, 1972, the state or local government in question maintained
"any test or device" (such as a literacy requirement) which, according to the Director
of the Census, contributed to the result that less than 50% of the persons in the state (or
subdivision) registered to vote during that year, or that less than 50% of the persons of
voting age actually voted. (For earlier years, the 1968 and 1964 election years were the
determinative dates.) 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1976). Application of the Act is thus
triggered by two separate findings of the executive branch, neither of which requires
determination that a single instance of "identified" discrimination has occurred. Simi-
larly, the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735 (1976), as amended (Supp. 1977), conditions the receipt of
federal grants under the Act on the requirement that 10% of the grants go to minority
enterprises. See pp. 161-62 & notes 116-24 supra. The committee reports make no
explicit finding of past discrimination, although it is clear from the legislative history
of the Act, as amended, that it was meant to overcome, inter alia, what Congress
considered to be widespread discrimination and underrepresentation of minority en-
terprises in the construction industry. See Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 605-08
(2d Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1978)
(No.78-1007). The findings of past discrimination involved in the promulgation of the
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A legislative finding of "societal discrimination" should there-
fore be no more objectionable under Justice Powell's analysis than
would be any other legislative finding of racial discrimination. The
former would reflect "constitutional or statutory violations" to the
same extent as other legislative findings:1 49 that is, to the extent that
any such findings rest on particular violations. ' 50 If a finding of soci-
etal discrimination is acceptable when made by a legislature, then it
cannot be that there is an inherently "amorphous" and "ageless"
quality about the concept which prevents the government from having
a valid and substantial interest in redressing the effects of societal
discrimination.
It should also be noted that Justice Powell voiced a third concern
in discussing the concept of "societal discrimination": he did not
believe the University was capable of making the kind of findings that
he saw as prerequisites to the imposition of a race-conscious rem-
edy. 151 Yet the delegation of power from a state legislature to subordi-
nate governmental entities is not a federal concern. 152 If the state
government may constitutionally advance a policy objective such as
redressing the effects of "societal discrimination," then it is of little
concern for constitutional purposes how the state chooses to allocate
the responsibility for making that policy choice. 153
Act amount essentially to findings of "societal" discrimination in the construction
industry. See generally id. at 606.
Given the nature of legislative decisionmaking, there is no meaningful distinction
between findings of "identified" discrimination and of "societal" discrimination in a
particular aspect of society, at least when legislative bodies are making the determina-
tions. Nor are findings of discrimination by administrative bodies necessarily particu-
larized, a point recognized by Justice Powell in Bakke, when he explained the "Phila-
delphia Plan" as being based on an administrative finding of past discrimination by the
industries affected. See note 117 supra.
149 This is true because "societal discrimination" is largely an aggregate of
individual instances of constitutional or statutory violations that have not been identi-
fied with particularity. The statutory framework prohibiting discriminatory conduct
extends to actions of private individuals, as well as to governmental actions. See
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968).
ISO See note 148 supra.
151 98 S. Ct. at 2758-59 (Powell, J.).
1.2 See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
153 As the Brennan Group stated in Bakke:
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Justice Powell's opinion thus presents no persuasive reason why a
governmental entity cannot determine that overcoming the present
consequences of past societal discrimination, through the appropriate
use of racial criteria, is a valid and substantial governmental interest.
To take that conclusion one step further, there can be no rational
objection to the validity and substantiality of the government's interest
in providing blacks with equal participation in all areas of American
life. 154 Once it is recognized that the adverse impact on individual
Generally, the manner in which a State chooses to delegate governmental
functions is for it to decide .... California, by constitutional provision, has
chosen to place authority over the operation of the University of California
in the Board of Regents .... Control over the University is to be found not
in the legislature, but rather in the Regents \who had been vested with full
legislative (including policymaking), administrative, and adjudicative
powers by the citizens of California .... This is certainly a permissible
choice, . . . and we, unlike our Brother POWELL, find nothing in the
Equal Protection Clause that requires us to depart from established principle
by limiting the scope of power the Regents may exercise more narrowly than
the powers that may constitutionally be wielded by the Assembly.
98 S. Ct. at 2788 n.42 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, J.) (citations
omitted).
154 The same reasoning should apply, for example, to the facts of a recent case in
which the equal participation objective was not recognized. A city council, in the
absence of a finding of individual discrimination, adopts an affirmative action program
to increase the number of black officers, sergeants and lieutenants on the city's police
force. When the program comes under constitutional attack, the city could respond that
the program seeks to redress the effects of past unidentified discrimination in a broad
spectrum of areas, and to provide blacks with the opportunity to participate equally in
the governance of the city through the important functions of the police. The
government's interest in providing that opportunity is valid and substantial. It is
consistent with the Reconstruction Amendments, and any adverse impact it may have
on whites is irrelevant to its constitutional validity. The city council is a legislative
body capable of making findings of "societal discrimination." The council's decision
to operate its police department in accordance with the affirmative action program is a
matter of state rather than federal concern.
Because the interest at stake is a valid and substantial one, the city government
should be able to adopt a race-conscious program in order to advance the interest. See
Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal
docketed, No. 78-1163 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 1978).
A similar argument can be made on the facts of another case recently decided in
light of Bakke. A state university's student government regulations require that two
minority members be appointed to the student legislature in the event fewer than two
are elected. The equal participation objective being advanced is that of providing
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whites is irrelevant to the constitutional importance of the governmen-
tal interest, and that the "amorphous" nature of societal discrimina-
tion does not negate the government's interest in redressing its effects,
then there can be no logical or principled rebuttal to the conclusion of
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun:
Davis' articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past
societal discrimination is, under our cases, sufficiently im-
portant to justify the use of race-conscious admissions pro-
grams where there is a sound basis for concluding that
minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and
that the handicap of past discrimination is impeding access
of minorities to medical school or to any other opportunities
to participate in American Society. 155
Remedying the effects of past societal discrimination - of the
social history of racism - and providing equal participation for blacks
in all aspects of American life furthers the goal of racial equality that
lies at the heart of the fourteenth amendment. 15 6 Whenever the gov-
"protective representation" for those whose voices in government have traditionally
been drowned out. The objective is a valid and substantial one: "condemnation of the
regulations because they impinge upon other individuals' rights is simplistic." Uzzell
v. Friday, 47 U.S.L.W. 2505 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 1979) (Winter, J., dissenting).
Iss 98 S. Ct. at 2785 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
156 It is now clearly established that the government may use gender-based crite-
ria in order to overcome the present consequences of the social history of sexism,
which has disadvantaged women as a group in comparison with men as a group.
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). As the Court noted in Califano, it is
permissible to "[redress] our society's longstanding disparate treatment of women."
430 U.S. at 317. In Bakke, the Brennan group relied on the gender-based discrimina-
tion cases to support the proposition that the University could use race-conscious
admissions criteria in order to aid victims of societal discrimination. 98 S. ct. at
2783-84, 2786-87 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). Justice Powell, on
the other hand, in the context of discussing why racial classifications were subject to
"strict scrutiny" while gender-based classifications were not, noted that "the percep-
tion of racial classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic
history that gender-based classifications do not share." Id. at 2755 (Powell, J.). If
gender-based criteria may be used to "redress our society's long-standing disparate
treatment of women" but, as Justice Powell would hold, race-conscious criteria may
not be used to overcome the present consequences of the social history of racism, there
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ernment acts to advance this objective, it is acting to advance a valid
and substantial governmental interest. In the years to come, it may be
hoped that the Court will so hold.
is a curious paradox. Apparently Justice Powell is of the view that the history of
societal sexism is not as "tragic" as the history of societal racism - a point on which
many advocates of equality for women would not agree - so that the use of gender-
based criteria is permissible where the use of race-conscious criteria may not be.
Carried to its logical conclusion, this means that because societal victimization of
blacks has been greater than societal victimization of women, the government may not
use race-conscious criteria to overcome the existing effects of societal racism, but may
use gender-based criteria to overcome the existing effects of societal sexism. Surely
Justice Powell cannot mean this. Since the Court has clearly sustained the use of
gender-based criteria to overcome the present consequences of societal sexism that are
felt by women as a group, it is difficult to see why the same rationale should not
sustain the use of race-conscious criteria to overcome the present consequences of
societal racism that are felt by blacks as a group. See Ginsburg, Women, Equality and
the Bakke Case, Civ. LIB. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 8-16.
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